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Mutually Reinforcing Strands
Legally Binding




• Biosafety and biosecurity in developing 
countries
Awareness
• Dual use dilemma
Responsible Conduct
• Ethical codes and behavior
International Biological Weapons 
Convention
National Implementing Legislation
Scientific and Health Community 
Codes of Conduct
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Article I 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes 
never in any circumstances to develop, produce, 
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 
• (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production, of types 
and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
• (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed 
to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in 
armed conflict. 
• Begins with development and not 
research
• Allows for biodefense for prophylactic and 
protective purposes
Filling the Gap
How to prevent  terrorists 
from acquiring dangerous 
pathogens used in research 
and research knowledge that 
could be used for 
bioterrorism
Material Control
CDC Laboratory  Registration/ Select 
Agent Transfer Program
• These regulations placed shipping and handling 
requirements on laboratory facilities that transfer or 
receive select agents capable of causing substantial 
harm to human health. They were designed to 
ensure that select agents are not shipped to parties 
who are not equipped to handle them appropriately 
or who lack proper authorization for their requests.
• Required adherence to CDC biosafety manual 
(BMBL)
• Took  effect April 1997
Export Control
• Australia Group
USA Patriot Act—Personnel Security
Restrictions on who can possess select 
agents
• Restricts aliens from countries designated as 
supporting terrorism and those who could not 
possess a handgun from possessing select agents 
within the United States
• Makes it an offense for a person to knowingly 
possess any biological agent, toxin or delivery 
system of a type or in a quantity that, under the 
circumstances, is not reasonably justified by 
prophylactic, protective, bona fide research or other 
peaceful purpose.
• In effect since October 26, 2001
Biopreparedness Act
Requires registration for possession of select 
agents
Requires HHS and USDA regulations (Federal 
Register notice on December 9, 2002; 
regulations took  effect February 7, 2003)
• requires clearance by Department of Justice
• tracks the acquisition, transfer and possession of 
certain biological agents and toxins
• requires safeguards and security regulations to be 
followed
• collects information for law enforcement; 
• establishes a process for alerting authorities about 
unauthorized attempts to acquire select agents
Defining the List—Select Agents
HHS NON-OVERLAP SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS AGENTS AND TOXINS
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus 
Coccidioides posadasii
Ebola viruses 
Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B virus) 





South American haemorrhagic fever viruses (Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Flexal, 
Guanarito)
Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses (Central European tick-borne 
encephalitis, Far Eastern tick-borne encephalitis, Russian spring and summer 
encephalitis, Kyasanur forest disease, Omsk hemorrhagic fever)
Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)







Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins 
Tetrodotoxin






Burkholderia mallei (formerly Pseudomonas mallei) 
Burkholderia pseudomallei (formerly Pseudomonas 
pseudomallei)
Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium 
Coccidioides immitis
Coxiella burnetii




Rift Valley fever virus 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus 
Botulinum neurotoxin 
Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin 
Shigatoxin
Staphylococcal enterotoxin
USDA HIGH CONSEQUENCE LIVESTOCK PATHOGENS AND TOXINS  (NON-
OVERLAP AND TOXINS AGENTS AND TOXINS)
Akabane virus
African swine fever virus
African horse sickness virus 
Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic) 
Blue tongue virus (Exotic) 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent 
Camel pox virus 
Classical swine fever virus 
Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater) 
Foot and mouth disease virus 
Goat pox virus 
Lumpy skin disease virus 
Japanese encephalitis virus 
Malignant catarrhal fever virus (Exotic) 
Menangle virus 
Mycoplasma capricolum/ 
M.F38/M. mycoides capri 
Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides
Newcastle disease virus (VVND) 
Peste Des Petits Ruminants virus 
Rinderpest virus 
Sheep pox virus 
Swine vesicular disease virus 







Ralstonia solanacearum race 3, biovar 2 
Schlerophthora rayssiae var zeae
Synchytrium endobioticum
Xanthomonas oryzae
Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain)
Germany
Act on the Reform of the Communicable 
Diseases Law (Communicable Diseases 
Law Reform Act) of 20 July 2000
Any person who wishes to import or export 
pathogens to and from the territory covered by 
this Act, store, supply or work with them there 
requires an authorization to do so from the 
competent authority.
A person who works under the supervision of 
someone who either has an authorization, or 
requires no authorization shall require no 
authorization
United Kingdom
The Anti–terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001
Strengthens legislation controlling weapons of mass 
destruction, and tightens controls on access to pathogens 
and toxins used in research laboratories in the United 
Kingdom.
• premises (such as universities and research 
establishments) must notify the Government if they hold 
certain dangerous substances and sets up a register of 
premises holding specified pathogens and toxins. 
• confers powers on the police to inspect such premises 
and give directions as to their security.
• requires managers of laboratories and other premises to 
furnish, on request, the police with details of people with 
access to any of the specified dangerous substances held 
there. 
• gives The Home Secretary power to direct that a named 
individual must not be allowed access to such disease 
strains or the premises in which they are held. 
• provides for extension to animal or plant pathogens and 
toxins
World Health Organization
“National standards should be developed that 
recognize and address the ongoing 
responsibility of countries and institutions to 
protect specimens, pathogens and toxins from 
misuse”
“Global events in the recent past have 
highlighted the need to protect laboratories and 
the materials they contain from being 
intentionally compromised in ways that may 
harm people, livestock, agriculture or the 
environment.”
World Health Organization
“Effective biosafety practices are the 
very foundation of laboratory 
biosecurity activities.”
“Assessment of the suitability of 
personnel, security-specific training 
and rigorous adherence to pathogen 
protection procedures are reasonable 
means of enhancing laboratory 
biosecurity.”
Technology Transfer
To be effective in deterring bioterrorism, 
controls on dangerous pathognes must be 
global in reach, covering research and 
diagnostic laboratories
Enhancing biosafety and biosecurity at all 
laboratories housing dangerous pathogens, 
especially those in the developing world, will 
require substantial financial and technical 
assistance.
The needed technology transfer should be 
seen as crucial for enhancing global 
biosecurity and considered within the articles 
of the BWC
Research Knowledge and 
the Dual Use Dilemma
Advances in the life sciences, especially in 
molecular biology and informatics, and the 
potential for misuse of scientific research 
(the "dual-use" dilemma) raise the 
possibility that an act of terrorism could 
involve biological agents or that science 
could be misused for biowarfare. 
There is “forbidden knowledge.”
Some information should be 
classified or shared on a limited 
basis
IAP STATEMENT ON BIOSECURITY
In recent decades scientific research has 
created new and unexpected knowledge and 
technologies that offer unprecedented 
opportunities to improve human and animal 
health and environmental conditions. But 
some science and technology can be used for 
destructive purposes as well as for 
constructive purposes. Scientists have a 
special responsibility when it comes to 
problems of "dual use" and the misuse of 
science and technology.
The Export Control Act (2002)
Includes control of information 
• “The Secretary of State may by order make 
provision for … the imposition of transfer 
controls in relation to technology of any 
description”, providing the Government with 
an opportunity to stifle the flow of scientific 
knowledge and hamper international research 
collaboration.
• “The Secretary of State shall not make a 
control order which has the effect of 
prohibiting or regulating the following 
activities—the effect of interfering with—the 
communication of information in the ordinary 
course of scientific research.
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee
The Scientific Response to Terrorism
November 6, 2003
We recommend that the Science Minister 
raise the issue of the publication of 
research data with potential misuses with 
other EU Member States as a first step in 
drawing up an EU–wide code of conduct 
for scientific publication.
Scientific communication must not 
become a casualty of the “war on 
terrorism”.
Journal Editors and Authors Group
The process of scientific publication, through which new 
findings are reviewed for quality and then presented to 
the rest of the scientific community and the public, is a 
vital element in our national life
Questions have been asked by scientists themselves 
and by some political leaders about the possibility that 
new information published in research journals might 
give aid to those with malevolent ends.
Fundamental is a view, shared by nearly all, that 
there is information that, although we cannot 
now capture it with lists or definitions, presents 
enough risk of use by terrorists that it should not 
be published. How and by what processes it 
might be identified will continue to challenge us, 
because – as all present acknowledged -- it is 
also true that open publication brings benefits 
not only to public health but also in efforts to 
combat terrorism.
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM:
CONFRONTING THE DUAL USE DILEMMA
Report of the 
Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent 
the Destructive Application of Biotechnology
“Fink Committee”
National Research Council
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
Defining the Sphere of Concern
For the near term the Committee considered 
microbial pathogens and toxins as the primary 
threat
The Committee identified seven classes of 
“experiments of concern” that illustrate the 
types of endeavors or discoveries that will 
require review and discussion by informed 
members of the scientific and medical 
community before they are undertaken or, if 
carried out, before they are published in full 
detail. 
These classes are process rather than organism 
based.
Experiments of Concern
1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine 
ineffective.
2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically 
useful antibiotics or antiviral agents
3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or 
render a nonpathogen virulent
4. Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen
5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen. 
6. Would enable the evasion of 
diagnostic/detection modalities
7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological 
agent or toxin 
US Government Biosecurity Initiative
Establish the National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to advise 
and guide  the government.  
• NSABB will provide advice and guidance 
regarding biological research that has 
the potential for misuse and could pose 
a biologic threat to public health or 
national security.
• NSABB will advise HHS Secretary, NIH 
Director, heads of all Federal entities 
that conduct/support life sciences 
research.
NSABB—Dennis Kasper Nov. 2005
Conclusions
Biosecurity must be global in reach
Need to begin by better defining  
sphere of concern
Need multi-pronged approach with 
both legally binding and ethical 
behavioral components
Must develop culture of responsible 
conduct
